Following the approach of standard filtering theory, we analyse investor-valuation of firms, when these are modelled as geometric-Brownian state processes that are privately and partially observed, at random (Poisson) times, by agents. Tasked with disclosing forecast values, agents are able purposefully to withhold their observations; explicit filtering formulas are derived for downgrading the valuations in the absence of disclosures. The analysis is conducted for both a solitary firm and m co-dependent firms.
Introduction
Motivated by applications from financial mathematics, we assume below that the flow of information reaching a market is influenced strategically by the agents responsible for making and subsequently disclosing observations, simply because observations made by a self-interested agent can be suppressed. For instance, suppose the agent's self-interest manifests itself as wanting only to report good news, and so to suppress bad news. If the cutoff that defines whether an observation is good or bad news is defined relative to prior expectations, then the agent will disclose only observations above the prior. A model of strategic reporting needs specifically to incorporate how potential recipients of disclosed observations (investors) can rationally respond to silence from the agent, when absence of observation cannot credibly be indicated by the agent and disclosure is not mandatory. We assume below that at Poisson arrival times the agent is able to observe information, and has then the option to disclose the observed information, but only truthfully, or to suppress it (i.e. hide the 'bad' news). Then the question arises: what is the optimal level of suppression. We answer below in Theorem 1 and Theorem 1 m with explicit formulas in a multi-agent multi-period context. We work in a continuous Black-Scholes framework introducing the novel concept of an optimal censor ( §2.2). This combines censoring with filtering (for which see [1] , [2] , [14] , [27] ). It is the key here. In particular we derive closed-form exponential decay solutions for the optimal time-varying censor in periods of silence; a new insight here is that penalization of silence is harshest at the beginning (see §3.2 Corollary for details). These are the pleasing consequence of moving to continuous time: simplification of the natural equilibrium conditions (e.g. (1) in §2.3 and in §3.1.1; cf. (10) ) to a first-order differential equation (see (6) in §3.1); a transparent narrative at the single agent level; a rich joint asset-price dynamic, via the repercussions on each other, of a stream of disclosures from the multiplicity of correlated agents. This paper is a sequel to our previous work, where such questions were pursued in a discrete two-period setting (in [30] and [19] for the case of one firm, and in [18] where further reality is added via a communication game with multiple competitors in an industry correlated by common operating conditions). We were motivated by the static-setting literature of costly state verification (e.g. by Townsend [34] in 1979 -see the later literature in [23] ), and of corporate disclosure introduced by Dye [16] in 1985 (and the associated paper [22] ).
The additional results in §4 highlight consequences of our main theorems for the bandwagon and quality effects in the current setting. These qualitative results extend our findings in the two-period model of [18] . For instance: when competing managers are endowed with different observation noise, those managers that observe with most noise use a lower censor and hence suppress bad news less. But then this means that, when investors see slightly-below-mean observations being disclosed by such managers, they rationally interpret this as being from a more noisy source, and so discount its importance when updating.
A broadly similar class of models arises in the engineering literature studying alternation between observation ('measurement') and control, typically in a discrete-time setting, but there the alternation is the result of a trade-off between the two actions, dictated by a single indicator of overall performance of a system (i.e. a suitable objective function); a related class considers intermittent receipt of measurements/observations, but there the suppression is caused by random transmission failures -see e.g. [9] , [21] , [32] .
In discrete time, Shin [31] introduced (in 2004) a model of a firm, engaged in a flow of projects, receiving information with a Poisson distribution concerning the status (success or failure) of projects completed to date. By endowing the firm with the opportunity at each date of a full or partial dis-closure of that information, he created an asset-pricing framework in which such disclosures are endogenously determined, and so could study equilibrium patterns of corporate disclosure.
In continuous time, Brody, Hughston and Macrina [8] introduced (in 2007) an asset-pricing framework based on noisy market-observation of continuous information that is generated from the remaining future disclosures, occuring at pre-determined ('mandatory') dates. Similarly to Shin, their disclosures are modelled as a discrete series of random variables; the latter give rise to a stream of uncertain payouts (cash flows) corresponding to the mandatory dates. The individual cash values are taken to be deterministic functions of independent random variables called 'market-factors' (not unlike our terminal-time output variable Z 1 ), but with the inclusion only of those that are capable of being observed by the modeller at and prior to the date of disclosure. Typically the market's noisy observation is a linear combination of the future payouts, each weighted by a coefficient that gains increasing prominence over time, and Brownian-bridge components, which vanish at the corresponding payout-dates. However, in contrast to Shin, all the disclosures are mandatory and the possibility of voluntary intermittent disclosures (say via a zero dividend) is not studied.
In a recent development, Marinovic and Varas [28] (in 2014) consider a voluntary disclosure model in continuous time, in which a single agent uninterruptedly observes an asset following a {0, 1}-valued random walk. (The binary aspect leads to market-price decay, which like ours is exponential.)
In creating a multi-asset Black-Scholes asset-pricing framework in which corporate disclosures are endogenously determined, our work is closest in spirit to Shin [31] . It is also closer in spirit with some of the earlier literature of portfolio/consumption analysis under incomplete information, e.g. Feldman's model in 1992 ( [17] ; cf. literature cited there) of a production exchange economy, where realized outputs are observed (whereas in the model below a noisy version of the output process Z t is observed), and provide via a nonlinear filter an information flow on the underlying economic state process (a 'productivity' factor, following an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean-reverting process).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In §2, abstracting away from the market motivation, we exploit in §2.1 some of the ideas of standard filtering theory to describe scalar observations by m individuals ('agents') that are made intermittently in the interval (0, 1) privately (i.e. in secret), and either kept secret or disclosed (reported) to the other agents and in-vestors. The observation processes have a co-dependance, as do also certain other scalar processes which assign a valuation to each agent. This co-dependance is determined by a single state-process called the common effect. The shared information, together with the initial mandatory observation values of time t = 0, provides the basis upon which to forecast each individual's valuation at the terminal time t = 1 of the next mandatory disclosure.
Agents disclose their observations in order to enhance at each moment the forecast of their terminal valuation, which is contingent on the mandatory disclosures at the terminal time. This leads to an optimization problem stated in §2.2. If each agent discloses only observations above their censoring threshold, keeping secret lower observed values, silence at any moment in (0, 1) can mean either the absence of observation, or its censoring (since the arrival of an undisclosed observation remains secret, and the agent is not able to assert credibly the absence of a current observation). Since periods of silence bring precautionary valuation downgrades, the threshold drops over time, pari passu, to elicit a disclosure; additional tensions arise from potential disclosures from other agents, so subgame perfect Nash equilibria considerations enter the argument -see §3.
Section 2.3 interprets the individual valuation as the market value of the firm obtained from information disclosed to the market by managers making discretionary (i.e. non-mandatory) disclosures in between the two mandatory disclosure times of t = 0 and t = 1.
Our two main results are stated and discussed in §3 and proved in §5.2, §5.3. In §4 the interpretation of §2.3 is used to describe, as immediate corollaries of earlier work, qualitative features of a multi-agent correlated sector.
We focus on valuations inferred from periods of silence hence the title.
Model
We first formalize the disclosure framework in a series of steps.
Processes and filtrations
We fix a stochastic basis (Ω, F , F, Q), with F := {F t : t ∈ [0, 1]}.
2.1.1. State process setup. The production of m ≥ 1 scalar processes from one (vector) process, and the uncertainties connected with this, will be modelled in terms of the fixed (F-Q)-Wiener process W t = (W 0 t , W 1 t , ..., W m t ), more precisely in terms of exponential martingales X and M i defined from the independent component processes of W, employing correspondingly the entries of the real vector σ = (σ X 0 , σ M 1 , . . . , σ M m ) ≥ 0 as follows 1 :
for every i ∈ I := {1, . . . , m}; here we assume as known the respective distributions at time-0 of these processes.
The process X has the dual roles of (economic) state process and signal process, and is regarded as representing a common effect that influences the individual internal histories via two processes as follows.
2.1.2 Ouput process. The output process Z t = (Z 1 t , ..., Z m t ), whose terminal state at time t = 1 is to be forecast, encodes the production of m signals from the state process as its single input; taking values in R m , it is defined componentwise by a weighted power-law:
for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}; here f i is the size constant of the i-th output and α i is termed the i-th loading exponent (loading factor), both positive, yielding the terminal output vector Z 1 . The exponent, which measures the exposure of a firm to common effects, enables empirical interpretation but is mathematically of little consequence (as though it had the value 1). To add a technical remark, it will be convenient in the proofs to rescale such a process to have size unity at some date, contingent on the available information, a procedure we call common-sizing. 2.1.3 Internal history process. The internal history process Y t = (Y 1 t , . . . , Y m t ) provides the source of intermittent noisy observations (which are to be selectively disclosed) of the output process Z t ; as this is to be a partially observable process, the construction uses the martingale M = (M 1 , . . . , M m ) as a linear noise to modify the output process:
We collect regression parameters associated with the processes defined so far. Put σ i := σ M i /α i , and define the associated precisions p i := 1/σ 2 i and p = p agg := p 0 + p 1 + ... + p m ; for convenience, we use dual notation for the regression coefficients (relative precisions):
κ i or κ i m := p i /p and κ i 1 = p i /(p 0 + p i ) for m = 1 with i the solitary firm.
2.1.5 Private observation process and private filtration. The observation of the economic realities embodied in the processes X, Y , and Z is modelled as an intermittent partial observation arising for an individual economic agent with label in {1, . . . , m}, and expressed as a private observation process Y i-obs . The constructions of these concepts below starts from a (càdlàg) Poisson process N t = (N 1 t , ..., N m t ) which is independent of the Wiener processes W t of §2.2.1 and whose vector of intensity functions λ t = (λ 1 t , . . . , λ m t ), the information arrival rate, is inhomogeneous and also known. The arrival times in (0, 1) of each component process N i are regarded as consecutively numbered, with θ i-obs n denoting the n-th of these; that is, on setting θ i-obs 0 = 0,
The intended meaning of this is that the i-th agent observes the process Y i-obs privately, and only at these arrival time in (0, 1); the last observation time at or prior to t and the corresponding last observed value are
The resulting process Y i-obs is the private observation process of agent i. It is piecewise constant, and defines the private filtration of the i-th agent. This is the (time indexed) family Y priv i of σ-algebras generated by the jumps at or before time t, and by the observations at or before time t, here regarded as space-time point-processes (i.e. with their dates -for background see [12, esp. II Ch. 15] ); it is formally given by
for t ∈ (0, 1), where we let Y i 0 contain all the null sets of F . 2.1.6 Public filtration. The public filtrations G pub , to be constructed next, formalize the notion of 'information disclosed via the publicly observed history of Y '. Their construction begins with a fixed marked point-process 2 (MPP) comprising the following list of items (i) to (iv). In terms of the MPP as above we obtain the publicly observed history, or public filtration, which is right-continuous and constructed in the three steps below:
and for each t in [0, 1), conventionally
with the σ-algebras G t generated as the join of the three σ-algebras corresponding to the items (i), (iii) and (iv) from §2.1.6, dates included, namely:
2.1.7 Disclosure filtration. The key concept for the paper is that of a public 2 As the Referee points out, it possible to construct the public filtration entirely from a vector of Poisson processes (with appropriate thinning), so that 'disclosers' are identified by coincidence of certain arrival times.
filtration G (in the sense of §2.1.6) which is a particular kind of subfiltration of the join ∨ i Y priv i of the private filtrations of §2.1.5. Its definition hinges on disclosure of observations at or above the current value of a 'reference process' γ which, crucially, is required to be predictable with respect to the public information that it itself generates.
We define the disclosure filtrations consistently generated from the (private) filtrations {Y priv i : i ∈ I} via the G-predictable censoring filter γ = (γ i t : i ∈ I), to be public filtrations satisfying additionally the following three conditions for each 0 < t < 1. These say that at each disclosure time there are disclosing agents as in (v), with their observations made public, as in (vi), because, as in (vii), these are above their censoring thresholds:
For such a filtration G pub , the counting-process arrival times occuring in (0, 1) in (ii) of §2.1.6 will be termed the voluntary disclosure event times (or just disclosure times if m = 1): θ pub 0 , θ pub 1 , ... .
Optimal censoring problem
Associated with a fixed disclosure filtration G = {G + t }, consistently generated via γ as in §2.1.7, is the process obtained by taking contingent expectations of the time-1 output Z 1 with respect to the time-t information subsets:
this process is interpreted as a G-predictable valuation process or G-forecasting process. The optimal censoring problem addressed below calls for the construction of a filtration G * , necessarily unique, whose associated forecasting process is the left-sided-in-time pointwise supremum over all G-forecasting processes, that is, for each time t ∈ (0, 1) and each agent i,
where the supremum ranges over the disclosure filtrations G = {G + t } of §2.1.7. In (OC) both sides of the equation depend only the public information available to the left of the date 3 t. By definition such a G * , if it exists, is unique. The main results of the paper give the solution in §3 of the optimal censoring problem for the geometric Brownian signal processes X of §2.1; Theorem 1 corresponds to the one-dimensional case m = 1, Theorem 1 m to the case of arbitrary integer dimension m ≥ 1. Remarks 1. Informally, the censoring problem requires agent i to reach disclosure/suppression decisions using only the history of all prior public information.
2. With the filtering theory language above, the optimal censoring problem amounts to the construction of a censoring-filter (process) γ t with the following properties (i) to (iii):
, generated through suppression of observations by reference to the process γ, is consistently generated from the private filtrations {Y i : i = 1, ..., m};
(ii) γ is G-predictable (this is crucial); (iii) for each i ∈ I and for each time instant t ∈ (0, 1), γ i t is chosen to be a cutoff maximizing the expected value of Z i 1 , given only past public information, and best response to the simultaneous censoring choices of γ j t for j = i (which is why γ needs to be G-predictable). Of course, this yields an individual private valuation for each agent. 3. The role of G above is to formalize the censoring of the private observation processes relative to information 'public' before any time-t disclosure, so in general distinct from the optional valuation process of the next section ( §2.3)
which models the later right-continuous public valuation at time t. 4. In Remark 2 the agent is a maximizer of an instantaneous objective linked to the terminal output (via its estimator). The alternative approach is to establish a single overall performance indicator for the entire trajectory of the estimator. Optimality of overall economic behaviour induced by instantaneous (sometimes called 'myopic') objectives is established for a class of models related to ours in Feldman [17] .
Application to asset-price modelling
We consider a single 'firm' Z i t in isolation, so omitting i when convenient. The manager of the firm (agent i) makes a mandatory declaration at time t = 1 of its (fundamental) value which, taking a Bayesian stance, is the manager's estimate/forecast of the firm's economic state Z 1 using Y 1 , namelỹ
. Below we use a standard martingale construction to create an asset-price process under Q (cf. [6] ); we then note the option values that censoring introduces, and observe that a censor, which induces indifference between disclosure and non-disclosure, preserves the risk-neutral character of the asset-price under Q.
Given a public filtration G, the associated forecasting process of §2.2. yields an analogue S of an asset-price process with
This construction also turns the reference measure Q (of the stochastic basis) into a risk-neutral valuation measure, a fact implied by the conditional mean formula, which for t < s asserts that
The disclosure cutoff γ is uniquely determined below by the asset-price process S, as follows. Fix t < s. At time t suppose that agent i is committed to using a cutoff γ t and is to choose a disclosure cutoff γ for use at the later date s. Assume, until further notice, absence of any public disclosures in the interval (t, s). Let D s (γ) be the disclosure event of time s corresponding to the agent i observing a value of Y s at or above γ, so that in terms of indicator functions
Equation (D) suggests that the Black-Scholes value of the one-or-nothing binary option on Y s with strike γ (represented by 1 Y (s)≥γ ) will emerge at the heart of our line of reasoning.
Next consider the complementary event ND s (γ) in which, given γ, the market computes a forecast for Z 1 as beingγ
If the agent wishes to maximise the asset valuation S at time s the choice γ will induce indifference between disclosure and non-disclosure when
. This observation and conditioning on knowledge at time t of the value 5
induces the following simple relation between the equilibrium valueγ s and γ t . (An even simpler limiting form arises in Theorem 1 in §3.1.) The relation involves the distribution of Z est
i.e of the time-s estimator of the terminal output Z 1 , conditional on the observation of Y s by the agent. (In (2) below, direct substitution causes a spurious inner conditioning; the Landau notation below has the sense: o(h)/h → 0, as h ↓ 0.) Proposition 1 (Conditional Bayes formula; cf. [22] ). In the single agent setting, conditional on there being no disclosure in the interval (t, s),
is equivalent for q ts := (s − t)λ t to
The proof is in §5.1. The 'indifference choice' of γ is of significance: we cite our earlier result here as: [19] ). In the setting of Propo-
Consequently, the computation of the (unique) solution forγ s reduces in the Black-Scholes setting to a simple application of the Black-Scholes formulas, using the model parameters of §2.1; see the discussion of Theorem 1 and the equivalent equation (7) below in §3.1.1.
Remark. From a market-valuation perspective on asset prices, the value of the future cutoff γ s (as above) must be impounded in the market measure, but this is exactly what (3) describes; so we may validly regard the riskneutral measure here as a summary of an underlying equilibrium marketmodel, such as is described by [13] .
Informal examples of censoring filters
In the simplest context of m = 1, take α 1 = 1 and f 1 = 1, so that Z 1 = X 1 . Given a filtration G generated via a censoring filter γ t as above, we may term observations of Y t relative to γ t as bad news at time t when below γ t , and as good news at time t when above or at γ t . Omitting mention of the time, we refer to good and bad news relative toγ 0 ,
is the ex-ante valuation of the output process, given the initial mandatory disclosure of Y 0 at time t = 0. We use the notatioñ
for the relevant regression function, conditional on a time-t disclosure y; here the available information from disclosures dated before time t is indicated by the informal subscript in the expectation operator, formalized as in §2.2 as conditioning on G t , so that
One presumes thatm t (.) incorporates the improving precision over time t of the observation process. In this context one may discuss possible forms of suppression of bad news (relative toγ 0 ), starting with two polar extremes: disclosure of all bad news (no suppression) versus suppression of all bad news. Neither of these can be supported by equilibrium considerations, but a natural third candidate, incorporating a suitable, downward, time-varying risk-premium adjustment format, is capable of equilibrium support -see Theorem 1 below.
Example (Suppression-risk adjustment). An economically justified piecewisedeterministic approach to censoring (for the case m = 1) modifies the idea of naive 'below the mean' suppression, by anticipating how investors factor into their risk-neutral valuation a suppression-risk premium. This leads to a downward adjustment of the censor.
Two complementary effects underlie this premium-factor approach. To understand this, suppose that the first disclosed observation occurs at the stopping-time
Subsequently, until a further disclosure occurs, a time-dependent downgrade factor should be applied for t > θ 1 to the meanm θ 1 =m θ 1 (Y obs θ 1 ) in recognition of two features: firstly, the possibility, as time evolves, of undisclosed observations occurring below the meanm θ 1 (with consequent lower conditional expected output valuation), and secondly, the improved accuracy in the forecasts of the output value Z 1 (by virtue of being closer to terminal time). Consequently, the observation cutoff γ t satisfiesm t (γ t ) <m θ 1 , for t > θ 1 , which -paradoxically -implies that observations leading to output valuations below the conditional mean may, after all, be disclosed; however, these give rise to a higher valuation than would otherwise arise from the downgraded mean. A secondary consideration is encouragement, as time evolves, for a valuation-maximizing agent to make a fresh disclosure; this effect must recognize that at any time t there is a minimal expected valuation of the terminal output, conditional on the uncertainty as to whether an observation was suppressed.
The risk-premium calculation is driven by the determinism of the Poisson arrival rate λ t , and the multiplicative nature of the three processes: output, observation, and state. In effect the risk-premium turns out to be a deterministic zero-coupon bond associated with a risky asset, valued at
In consequence, introducing 'disclosure times' by reference to γ t , inductively starting with θ 1 := inf{t > 0 :
; here as earlier θ − (t) denotes the last disclosure time at or below t. That is,γ t arises as though through a bond-like 'forward pricing' mechanism. Hereγ t =m t (γ t ), with γ t the cutoff for disclosure of Y t . Reference to consecutive down-crossing times, using such a formula, readily yields an inductive construction of G as a subfiltration of Y priv .
The lesson of this example is two-fold. Firstly, the censoring filter γ t for Y t is a piecewise-deterministic Markov process in the sense of M. H. Davis [15] , becausem t (.) is a deterministic function. Secondly, one may readily describe the 'disclosure' filtration determined by γ t from Y priv by an inductive construction, as a subfiltration of Y priv generated by the stoppingtimes defined above, θ 1 , θ 2 , .... Indeed, this points towards an alternative formalization of public filtrations from stopping-times.
3 Intra-period valuation: non-disclosure decay
In this section a consistently generated filtrationḠ with its censoring filter γ as defined in §2.1.7 is given and assumed to be an optimal censoring filter in the sense of (OC). The latter is seen to be uniquely characterized as a piecewise-deterministic Markov process in the sense of [15] (inevitably sosee [9] and [26] ) capable of generating a public filtration from {Y priv i : i ∈ I} under which the censoring process is predictable. First, we consider the simpler case m = 1 (leaving the general case m > 1 to §3.2), and state the theorem asserting an explicit solution to the filtering problem (arising from a 'cutoff equation' characterizing γ s , for t < s < θ + , which takes the form of a simple differential equation). The proof of the theorem is in §5.2, but we comment after the statement that the optimal censor satisfies a Bayesian updating rule at time s, from which our differential equation follows.
Single agent case
The situation when m = 1, and only the i-th agent is involved, follows. As in §2.3, between public disclosure dates, we must refer not only to the censor γ t which is applied to the observation Y t , but also to the image process
In the Black-Scholes framework the time-t regression function γ → E[Z 1 |Y t = γ, G t ] is monotonic. In the single agent context, since the single observer is the only source of any expansion of the public filtration, it is in principle possible to work in the language of disclosure/censoring solely of the forecast E[Z 1 |Y t , G t ] by reference toγ t , rather than of the disclosure/censoring of the observation Y t . However, in the multiple agent setting this cannot readily be done, since other agents may expand the public filtration and so the connection (in equilibrium) betweenγ i t and γ i t is more complicated. So one simply has to chase both sets of variables. For technical reasons connected with 're-starting' the Wiener process (at t and at θ pub − (t)), the censors need to be re-scaled to unity at the re-starting date, hence the appearance also of a further processγ t in the Corollary below. (See §2.1.4 for the relevant parameters.) In Theorem 1 reference is made to a fixed public filtrationḠ and also to general public filtrations G as in (OC) in §2.2 above; moreover, a connection is made between the optional valuation E[Z 1 |Ḡ + t ] at the disclosure in (i), and the predictable valuation process E[Z 1 |Ḡ t ] in (ii) -cf. §2.2. Below Φ denotes the standard normal distribution. The corresponding output-forecast process has the following properties:
or explicitly here, for t = θ pub − (t),
where, on the extreme left of the display above, the left-sided-in-time supremum (as in (OC)) ranges over all public filtrations G = {G + t } and, on the extreme right: g * is as in (i ) above, while in the valuation formula there is a thinned decay-intensity given by
(iii) in each inter-arrival interval, the cutoff γ t for the disclosure of an observation of Y t satisfies
where β =β i : [0, 1] → R (with β(1) = 1) is a decreasing deterministic weighting function of time, identified explicitly in Lemma 2 of §5.2.
In particular, the optimal censor γ t is a unique, piecewise-deterministic Markov process.
The proof is in §5.2. The cutoff for disclosure of the output-forecast obtained in Theorem 1 has the prescribed explicit form, sinceγ t = sup G E[Z 1 |G t ] satisfies the censoring differential equatioñ
referred to in §1. It may be interpreted in the context of §2.3 as expressing the risk premium of information suppression, in a way which hints at generalization to a broader class of models, one where regime shifts are accompanied by optional, so strategic, 'protective' activity, their exercise rates balancing the marginal protective-option value. The following result explains how 'silence' (non-disclosure) is penalized less and less as time plays out.
Corollary. In the setting of Theorem 1, the output-forecast processγ t for 0 < t < 1 has the following properties:
(a) its jumps occur at the disclosure times θ pub n and are upward; (b) between jumps, the output-valuation process has the representatioñ γ t =γ t g * (θ pub n−1 ), where the (rescaled cutoff ) deterministic functionγ t satisfies:γ ′ t = −γ t ν t , for θ pub n−1 < t < θ pub n , withγ(θ pub n−1 ) = 1; (c) (decreasing thinning) in any interval between disclosure times the relative decay-intensity ν t /λ t is decreasing;
(d) between consecutive non-disclosure intervals the intra-period relative decay intensity ν t /λ t decreases (to zero as t → 1).
Proof. This is immediate -the routine proof is omitted.
Game-theoretic Aspects of Theorem 1
We stress the role of game-theoretic principles underlying the proof: the indifference principle, Bayesian updating, equilibrium, . Given information at time 0 < t < 1, the cutoff value γ s is characterized at any time s with t < s < θ + (t) ≤ 1 by the observer's indifference at time s, when observing Y s , between disclosing the observed value if Y s = γ s and not disclosing it; this is because the public valuation is identical in both circumstances. Indeed, the valuation is identical, because in the time interval (t, s] with probability 1 − (s − t)λ t + o(s − t) (as s ↓ t) the agent has not observed Y s , and this event cannot be distinguished by outsiders from the event that the agent observed Y s , but did not disclose the observed value of Y s (since it was below γ s ). This yields the indifference (equilibrium) condition as a conditional Bayes formula:γ
where, as earlierγ s := E[Z 1 |Y s = γ s , G + t ] and G = {G + t } here denotes the public filtration.
The significance of (7) is that it is a special case of the Nash Equilibrium condition (10) below; the equation (7) first appears in the static model of Dye [16] to model rationality of partial (voluntary) disclosures, as a contrast to the total disclosure principle ('unravelling') of Grossman and Hart [20] .
Cutoffs and the Black-Scholes formula
A consequence of (7) (and of (10) below) and is a Black-Scholes formula for the cutoff γ =γ s applied to the forecast (rather than the observation). The calculation goes back at least to [22] (cf. [18] ), where (7) in the present context reduces to:
(cf. Prop. 1 and §5.1). Here F denotes the random variable E[Z 1 |Y s , G + t ], with mean µ F (conditional at time t+), q = (s − t)λ t is the probability with which an observation occurs (independently of F ) by time s, and H F (γ) is the 'lower first partial moment below a target γ', well-known in risk management 6 , briefly termed (in view of its key role) the hemi-mean function.
The log-normal F above, prompts a standardization in terms of the parameters λ, σ for the solution γ = γ LN (λ, σ) of The behaviour of the solution derives from the properties of the Black-Scholes put formula as a function of its strike -equivalently of the corresponding call formula as a function of its underlying asset price (Black-Scholes 'put-call symmetry', cf. [BarNS, § 11.4], [BjeS], [CarL] -for background see [Teh] ). For strike γ and expiry at time 1, conditional on an initial asset valuation of γ t at time t < 1, the formula reads
with Φ the standard normal distribution as above.
Consequently, at any time t between consecutive voluntary disclosures, setting the strike above to γ =γ s yields in the limit as s ↓ t (withγ s →γ t ) an at-the-money limiting forward-start call formula; this at-the-money optionvalue simplifies toγ t 2Φ(σ t /2), as in (5) . We hope to return to this aspect elsewhere.
Other Comments
The decay-intensity rate ν t is composed of two factors both having economic significance. First, the Poisson intensity λ measures the instantaneous opportunity cost of the arrival of an observation of information about the output valuation, and impounds the chance both for a valuation upgrade (through a good observation), and for the suppression of poor observation value. Secondly, the intensity λ is thinned by the probability of suppressing poor valuation, the effect of a 'protective put'. Over time the protective put loses value and tends to zero as the precision improves (i.e. the volatility goes to zero).
To see the details of the formula intuitively, recall that, as above, it is assumed that the observer chooses to achieve the maximum valuation, and thus makes a voluntary disclosure according to the rule: find the cutoff function t → γ t such that for t = θ obs n : (i) disclose credibly the value of Y , when Y t ≥ γ t , or, equivalently, the public output-forecast Z est
, one may restate the Y -cutoff problem (of choosing γ t ) in isomorphic terms as a cutoff problem for Z est ing its corresponding cutoffγ t ), assuming the regression functionm t (y) := E t [Z 1 |Y t = y] is monotonic.
Multiple agent case
We now consider the general case m > 1. Here the starting point is a system of equations that relates the values {γ i t : i = 1, ..., m} to each other by reference to a general Bayesian updating rule having the form of a system of (subgame) Nash equilibrium conditions for i = 1, ..., m:
with ND j t (γ) being the non-disclosure event (of time t). The intended meaning is that, contingent on the information available prior to time t, in the event that all of the agents make no disclosures (for lack of observations, or because observations lie at or below their respective filtering-censor value) and the i-th agent's observation is identical to the value of the respective filtering-censor γ i t , the corresponding output estimate value (i.e. Z i 1 in expectation) is the same whether, or not, that agent chooses to disclose the observation. (Recall the equational convention in the footnote of §2.3.) The conditions (10) generalize (3) of §2.3 -see also §3.1.1 above.
Note that ND j t (γ) is complementary to D t (γ), as earlier defined in §2.3 (though here in respect of the j-th agent).
In the inter-arrival period the absence of any disclosure from all of the m observation processes will influence the decay rate of each of the optimal observation filtering censors differentially, i.e. the filtering equation is bound to express the interdependence flowing from the Nash Equilibrium conditions (10) above. To express the explicit form, we need a number of parameters derived from the volatilities of §2.1. Using an abbreviating tilde notation, put σ 2 0i := σ 2 0 + σ 2 i andσ 2 0i (t) := (1 − t)σ 2 0i , and analogously:
Of particular significance is the functionρ i (t), which denotes for given t the (conditional) partial covariance (cf. [11] ) of the i-th component of (..., σ 0W 0 1−t + σ iW i 1−t , ...) on the remaining components, whereW denotes the Wiener process W re-started at time t.
We may now state the general theorem; use of the subscript 'hyp' here is explained in the discussion below. The functionβ i m corresponds toβ i in Theorem 1, and is derived in Lemma 2 m of §5.4.
, is as earlier, but y it replaces γ it to allowỹ it to have another meaning, corresponding to a rescaling of Y i s toỸ i s in the proof. The notation here ofḠ and G is similar to that in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 m (Filtering rule during continued non-disclosure: m ≥ 1). For the model of §2, suppose y t = (..., y it , ...) is a càdlàg optimal censoring filter generating a disclosure filtrationḠ with associated sequence ofḠ-disclosure-arrival times 0 = θ pub
, at which disclosure events occur. Then, for 0 ≤ n ≤ ℓ, the corresponding output-forecast process has the following properties: (i) disclosure updating condition (the i-th agent's 're-initialization')
where on the extreme left, the left-sided-in-time supremum ranges over public filtrations G = {G + t } and, on the extreme-right, the correlation-aggregated decay-intensity v agg is
and
(iii) in each inter-arrival interval between disclosure event times, the disclosure censor y i t of the i-th agent is given for θ = θ pub n−1 ≤ t < θ pub n by:
In particular, the optimal censor y t is a unique, piecewise-deterministic Markov process.
Note that for m = 1 this reduces to Theorem 1. The proof is in §5.3 and depends (as does Theorem 1) on the factorization of the process M = M i (with σ M for σ M i ) for fixed t in the self-evident form
Discussion of Theorem 1 m . This result builds on Theorem 1, hence bears appropriate similarities (e.g. updating at disclosure dates), and relies on the conditional Bayes formula (7), so we now comment only on what is most significantly different here for m > 1, namely the need to disaggregate the codependance. To define the observation cutoffs of the m observing agents, one first constructs m corresponding agents, termed hypothetical agents, each of whom faces a suppressed-observation problem of the kind considered in Theorem 1, but in isolation. This introduces two features: firstly, an amendedmean factor L −i (t), multiplying the current conditional mean of the observation process (defined in Theorem M of §5.3 and reflecting incremental effects of a single agent, that are based only on loading and precision factors) -and, secondly, the partial covarianceρ i , arising from the use of the Schur complement (see [5, Note 4.27, p .120], cf. [24, Ch. 27] , [25, § §46.26-28] ). The corresponding hypothetical observation-cutoffs are later aggregated to yield observation cutoffs of the original m-agent problem. From these observation cutoffs a current forecastγ i t of the i-th output Z i 1 is derived. Recall that in Theorem 1 the formula forγ t required the use of a rescaled functionγ t (with unit value at t = θ, the latest disclosure date). Likewise in Theorem 1 m we also see a functionγ i t used in similar fashion to constructγ i t ; here the size-constant k i m corresponds to f i , and reflects relative output magnitude, just as κ i reflects relative precision.
Application: Market valuation with censored voluntary disclosures
The differential equations of Theorem 1 m can be used to derive comparative statics of price formation in an asset market, in which investors expect voluntary disclosures (with positive probability) at all times between the two fixed mandatory disclosure dates. These comparative statics are concerned with intervals of time during which the agents are known to be privately and intermittently observing noisy signals of the asset values, arising from the common effect. The interpretation of §2.3 extends here to
as an asset-price process (with expectations under Q as the market's riskneutral valuation measure). Agent i is endowed intermittently with private information about the evolution of the i-th asset price via the martingale Y i t , and can voluntarily disclose information about the asset to the market. At times t strictly between consecutive public disclosure arrival times, conditioning on G + t or on G t yields identical forecasts of the time-1 valuation E[Z i 1 |G + 1 ], so correspondingly the asset price S i t is identical
, whereγ i t is the unique valuation-cutoff given by Theorem 1 m . Furthermore, §2.3 describes disclosure behaviour as being incentivized so that the asset price gives the current stock-holders (investors) asset valuations that are maximal given the available public information.
The effects on price formation may thus be studied by recourse to the observation cutoffs employed by the respective agents in terms of the parameters of the model: the precisions p i , the loading factors α i , and the private observation arrival intensities λ i . It is interesting to note the predictions about suppression. Since the correlation between firms and the environment factor are positive, the formulas established above imply that a good-news bandwagon effect holds: ceteris paribus, agents all choose a higher cutoff (relative to the single agent case m = 1), reducing the probability that they will release private observations. Additionally, there is an intuitively clear estimator-quality effect, which leads to agents being partitioned into belowand above-'average precision' (over the m-agent population), as in the theorems that follow. Those with below-average precision are shown to adopt a lower cutoff (relative to the single agent case), and ceteris paribus increase the probability that they will release private observations, with the reverse holding for the above-average. Bandwagon Theorem. In any intra-period the presence of correlation increases the precision parameter of the cutoff and hence raises the cutoff:
whereγ LN (λ, σ) denotes the unique solution of the following equation in y :
and represents the normalized cutoff in the single agent case, as in (9) .
Proof. This is immediate from the static model of [18, §6] .
When the correlation is positive, there is also a counter-vailing precision effect on the related hypothetical agent's cutoff, arising from the amended mean factor L −i (see the discussion of Theorem 1 m above), when the actual agent has below-average precision, as defined below.
Estimator-Quality Theorem. Suppose that m ≥ 2 and α i > 0 for all i. The amended mean L −i (t) of the hypothetical firm i increases with p i and
In particular, if the loading index is identical for all firms, then
Otherwise, if 0 < α i < α j and p i < p j , then also L −i (t) < L −j (t).
The amended mean is a strict deflator, i.e. L −i (t) < 1, iff p i is below the loading-adjusted competitor average, i.e. p i < p n − 1 + α i := p av,-i so that for α i = 1 one has p av,-i = p/n.
Proof. This again is immediate from the static model of [18, §6] .
Thus low-precision managers are more likely to make a disclosure, but by definition the disclosure will be less precise. Hence, in terms of giving it weighting in the updating rules, investors will give less weight to disclosure of bad news by such imprecise managers.
Proofs
We begin in §5.1 with a Proof of Proposition 1 and use it in §5.2 to prove Theorem 1, but only after we have prepared the ground with the calculations in two lemmas. In §5.3 we prove Theorem 1 m ; the argument will require generalizations of the lemmas of §5.2, and these are relegated to §5.4.
Proof of Proposition 1
In the notation of §2, we havẽ
.
Putting q ts = (s − t)λ t , expressing Q as dQ, cross-multiplying and rearranging
where the last line is from integrating by parts.
Proof of Theorem 1
This section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 1.
Idea of the proof. This rests on two observations. The first is that, since the regression functionm t (γ) := E[Z 1 |Y t = γ, G t ] is explicit (Lemma 1 below -but here we omit the agent's index) and monotone, the censoring behaviour dictated by a cutoff function γ t for the disclosure of Y t may be equivalently expressed as a censoring functionγ t for the disclosure of the valuation processZ t :=m t (Y t ), wherẽ
The second -the nub of the proof (from Prop. 1) -is thatγ t may be characterized by an equation expressing the agent's indifference between nondisclosure and disclosure ofZ t whenZ t =γ t . Such an equation givesγ t only implicitly; however, a variational analysis of the equation explicitly determinesγ t via an easy differential equation. Inverting the regression yields γ t in explicit form as γ t =m −1 t (γ t ). In the variational analysis above, the agent treatsZ t as a noisy signal of Z 1 on the grounds that E t [Z 1 |Z t , G t ] = E t [Z 1 |Y t , G t ] =Z t . This leads to a twoperiod analysis, in which the process value Z 1 is viewed, from the standpoint of information of time t, as a random variable, and permits exploitation of known results from two-period analyses.
Although m = 1 below, having in mind the notational needs of §5.3, where m > 1, it is helpful to employ here a general index i for the single agent of interest (rather than to specialize i = 1), thereby anticipating the later general case. Also, as m = 1, the index i can be omitted at will, whenever convenient. We begin with some auxiliary results stated as Lemmas 1 and 2, which will require the notation
The exponent 1 2 κ(κ − 1)σ 2 in µ above corresponds to the second-order term of Itô's Lemma for the power function t → t κ , a recurring feature of the regression formulas (from Lemma 1). For other parameters refer to §2.1.
Recall the tilde notation of §3.2 that, for any constant σ, we writeσ 2 for the functionσ 2 (t) := σ 2 · (1 − t), corresponding to re-starting the model at time t. In particular, withσ 2 0i := α 2
. For convenience, we may denote X also by M 0 . For the Wiener processes W i , recall the corresponding Wiener process re-started at time t
(SoW 0 = 0.) Omitting suffices and writing σ W for σ M i ,
We need two lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Valuation of Z 1 given observation Y 1 for m = 1). Put
We cite and apply a formula from [18, Prop. 10 .3, with n = 1]. To distinguish notational contexts, we use overbars on letters when citing formulas from there. The noisy observation there,T , of a random (state) variableX takes the formT =XȲ , whereX andȲ are independent random variables, with their log-normal distributions having underlying normal precision parametersp X ,p Y respectively. The required formula is
We will takeX = X 1 andȲ = M 1/α 1 , with M = M i and α = α i below. We first compute the corresponding constantsp X ,p Y andK α . Substituting s = 1 − t = ∆t in (12) above, gives
Conditional on the realizations of X 1−∆t and M 1/α 1−∆t ,X andȲ have respective underlying conditional variances of σ 2 0 ∆t and σ 2 i ∆t, as σ M i /α i = σ i . So the corresponding regression coefficient κ forX onȲ is
having cancelled ∆t > 0 from numerator and denominator; this remains constant as ∆t varies, and so also in the passage as ∆t → 0. Also
and so, conditioning on Y i 1 = y, and setting k = f 1−κ ,
Below the deterministic functionsβ i factor intoβ i indiv ,β agg to anticipate m-fold versions which 'separate' individual and aggregate effects of agents.
Lemma 2 (Time-t conditional law of the valuation of Z 1 , given ob-
with k = k i 1 as in Lemma 1, and:
(ii)Ẑ t log-normal, its underlying mean-zero normal of varianceσ 2 t = κα 2 iσ 2 0i . In particular, this time-t distribution has mean given by
In particular, condition on Y i t = y, take δ = κ above, and set Z t :=Ẑ t (κ); then, by (13) and with k as in Lemma 1 above, the conditional time-t distribution of E[Z 1 |Y 1 , G 1 ] is that of the variable Z est t given by
Proof of Theorem 1. Below we suppress reference to the unique agent i. We condition on the event θ pub − (t) ≤ t < s < θ pub + (t), i.e. that there has been no subsequent disclosure in (t, s]. Denote by γ t the càdlàg censor assumed in Theorem 1. For t ≤ u ≤ s, let ND u (γ) denote the event that, at time u, either ∆N(u) = 0 or the agent observes Y s to be below γ, and letγ u be the time-u evaluation of the random variable E[Z 1 |Y 1 , G 1 ]; theñ
As in §2. 3 
withβ u =β i u denotingβ i evaluated at u, as in Lemma 2 above, so that
For u > t, putγ u :=γ u /γ t (so thatγ t = 1), thus rescaling E[E[Z 1 |Y 1 , G 1 ]|G + t ], the time-t valuation of E[Z 1 |Y 1 , G 1 ], to unity; we now work as thoughγ t = 1. Let the corresponding time-u valuation be the random variableẐ u of Lemma 2. The underlying zero-mean normal random variable of the Lemma has varianceσ 2 u := κ 2σ2 0i (u). In the notation of Lemma 2, with q ts := (s − t)λ t the formula of Prop. 1 gives
Dividing by −q ts and rearranging the differential term, by the Black-Scholes formula
Rearranging once more and, using the abbreviating notationσ 2 t for the variance,
Because y u is càdlàg, so also areγ u andγ u ; so the terms on the right have a limit as s ↓ t. As q ts → 0, the functionγ(u) is seen to be right-differentiable at t, and, since Φ(−u) = 1 − Φ(u),
or equivalently, recalling thatσ 2
Now unfixing t, we permit t to vary over an interval during which there is no disclosure. Solving the differential equation, by integrating from the last disclosure date θ − (t) ≥ 0 to the date t, and conditioning on t being prior to the next disclosure θ + (t), gives the following:
Note that asσ u ≥ 0, the factor [2Φ(σ s /2) − 1] is non-negative.
So the conditional time-t evaluation of
for θ = θ − (t) (and with t unfixed), where noŵ
by abuse of notation, as this function satisfies (14) , but withγ(θ − (t)) = 1.
To obtain the explicit form, apply Lemma 2 with θ = θ − to give
where, re-instating the index i,
). Finally, the cutoff for Y i u is given explicitly by Lemma 2 as
Proof of Theorem 1 m
This section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 1 m , which is like Theorem 1, but more intricate in its details on account of an application of a result from [ 7) ]). In the setting of this section, after rescaling so that Y i t = 1, with observations Y i s of time s > t replaced by their re-scaled versionsỸ i s , the simultaneous conditional Bayes equations determining the cutoffs forỸ i s may be reduced to a non-singular system of linear equations relating the log-cutoffs to the hypothetical cutoffs g i defined below. Furthermore, the unique solution for the disclosure cutoffỹ i for the observation ofỸ i s is given by
where
(the 'amended mean' -an adjustment coefficient for the cutoff),
and where: γ LN (λ, σ) denotes the unique solution of the following equation in y :
κ i =p i /p (the standard regression coefficient), κ −i =p i /(p −p i ) (removing agent-i's contribution from the aggregate precision), 1 −ρ 2 i is the partial covariance ofw i on the remaining variatesw j , with w j (t) := σ 0W
Proof strategy. The results of [18] concern a two-period model in which there is an initial time (taken here to be a fixed time t < 1), a second 'interim date' (taken here to be a time s with t < s < 1), and a terminal date of 1, as here. Furthermore, that model refers to random variables, whose realizations describe values which are to be disclosed at the (mandatory) disclosure terminal date. Agent i in [18] has at the interim date (time s, here) a positive probability of receiving a private, noisy observationT i =XȲ i withX the state random variable andȲ i the noise; the random variables are independent, log-normally distributed, with underlying normals having zeromean and precisionsp 0 andp i , respectively. The probability of observation is described by the oddsλ i . The agent seeks to maximize the interim-date expected value of Z i := f iX α i , by selecting a unique cutoffγ i forT i . The model may be notationally summarized as Mn(Z|T 1 , ...,Tn;λ 1 , ...,λn), withn the number of agents. The value ofγ i is unique and is described in Theorem M by suitable aggregation of cutoffsγ i obtained by reference ton independent simpler single-agent models M 1 (Z hyp-i 1 |T hyp i ;λ i ), the solitary agents i being the hypothetical agents (corresponding to the original agents i); the original correlations between agents are removed, by way of the Schur complementspecifically via a partial covarianceρ i (measuring covariance of the i-th agent on the others, as described in the theorem; see [5, Note 4.27, p .120], cf. [24, Ch. 27] , [25, § §46.26-28] ). Theorem M prescribesγ i for the common-sized (cf. §2.1.2) hypothetical observation variate:
i.e. with precision parameter altered by the factor α iκi 1 −ρ 2 i . This result comes from employing, in the spirit of §5.2, a monotone singlevariable conditional regression function, e.g.m(t 1 |γ 2 ,γ 3 , ...) := E[Z i 1 |T 1 = t 1 &(∀j > 1)(T j =γ j )], to find the cutoff for the corresponding conditional valuationZ
. The characterizing equation reduces to an equivalent unconditional one, where all but one of the noisy observations is absent.
The proof in outline runs like this. (i) Apply Theorem M. To achieve the formatT i =XȲ i replace Y i t bỹ
Fix times t, s with t < s; assume non-disclosure throughout (t, s]; construct random variables, which at time s describe outcomes of time 1; for these compute appropriate statistics; pass to the hypothetical processes. At this point the latter are defined implicitly only. Much of this part of the proof is deferred to §5.4 Lemmas 1 m and 2 m (versions of Lemmas 1 and 2 for general m), where we compute the constants k i m and deterministic functions β i t such that for κ i = κ i m E[Z i 1 |Y t = y t , G t ] = k i m β i t y κ 1 1t ...y κ i mt .
(ii) Obtain explicit formulas for y hyp s by variational analysis: compute the dynamics of the valuation cutoffs γ i t of the 'estimators'Ẑ hyp i t = E[Z hyp-i 1 |G t ] from the dynamics of the hypothetical processes. Being hypothetical models with state and observation processes identical, these observation and valuation cutoffs are the same as y hyp s .
Since Theorem M applies to variables that have been common-sized to unity at the ex-ante date t, put G i (u) =ẑ i (u)/ẑ i (t), so that G i (t) = 1 for each i. Then, corresponding to a common-sized process, there is a hypothetical process (g-process) with adjusted value G i (u)L −i (u) as at time u, and with a hypothetical volatility per unit time of Now G(u)/G(t) =ẑ u /ẑ t is a càdlàg process (as a function of u, because each y ju is, and the equations connecting the log-cutoffs and the hypothetical logcutoffs have non-singular matrix). So the right-hand side has a limiting value as s ↓ t. Hence G(u)L(u), and so G(u), is right-differentiable at u = t < 1.
Passing to the limit (as in §5.2)
Performing the differentiation, we obtain the following
Butẑ 
2. (Actual correlated observation dynamics). We apply the formula of Theorem M to obtain the cutoffsỹ i t forỸ i t . To have common-sizing at time θ, setγ i (t) :=ỹ i (u)/ỹ i (θ) for θ = θ − < t < θ + . Returning to the corresponding actual agent i, substitution from (18) We rearrange this to separate out two components displayed below. The first, a continuous "inter-arrival discounting" term, generalizes the single observer case, as a regression-weighted average over the hypothetical counterparts:
